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14 Lack of Education 
PETER F. ORAZEM ~-
This chapter reviews the stylized facts regarding the distribution of 
human capital investments and the returns to those investments in 
developing countries. It then examines recent evidence regarding which 
policies can induce increased human capital investments in the most 
efficient manner, using estimated benefits and costs as a guide. Supply-
side strategies such as increasing school access or improving school 
quality are more costly, have less certain benefits, and have a weak 
record of success. Demand-side interventions such as school sited 
health programs, vouchers, and conditional transfers have a greater 
likelihood of improving literacy in the most cost-effective manner. 
1. Benefits 
Few empirical relationships have been more frequently investigated than 
that between years of schooling and earnings. Literally hundreds of 
studies using alternative data sets from developing and developed coun-
tries, spanning many decades, and employing alternative specifications 
to correct for various potential sources of bias, have derived amazingly 
consistent estimated private returns per year of schooling. ' Average 
returns are almost universally positive and at or above market returns 
on other investments. Using harmonized household data sets from 48 
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1 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) present the most recent review of findings 
from developing countries. Card (1999) contains an excellent review of the various 
estimation methods and biases associated with analysis of the returns to schooling. 
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developing countries, Fares, Montenegro and Orazem (2007) found that 
returns for women average 9.6% compared to 7.1% for men, and 8.1% 
for urban residents compared to 7.5% for rural residents. There may be 
external benefits from schooling beyond those that go to the individual. 
These social benefits include improved governance due to an educated 
electorate, improved climate for growth due to agglomerations of skilled 
individuals, reduced fertility behavior, and improved household health.2 
The finding of positive returns on schooling across a wide array of 
countries at all stages of development suggest that education offers 
consistent returns in almost all economic settings. Nevertheless, a year 
of schooling will be even more productive in some environments than 
others. As argued by Schultz (1975), human capital is most valuable in 
markets experiencing technological, production or price shocks that 
require adaptation, whether by moving to industries or areas with the 
strongest labor demand, adopting or developing new technologies, or 
switching occupations to fulfill market needs.3 Good adaptive deci-
sions require a reward, and so human capital will be most valuable 
when social or governmental institutions place few restrictions on 
mobility or trade, when wages and prices are flexible, and when prop-
erty rights are enforced.4 An example of the role of freer markets in 
enhancing human capital productivity is the rapid increase in returns 
to schooling observed in virtually all formerly planned economies as 
they transitioned toward market systems (Fleisher et al., 2005). 
2 Pritchett (2004) questioned the importance of these externalities because of the 
unstable relationship between growth in measures of aggregate human capital 
and aggregate output, bur there is strong microeconomic evidence that human 
capital improves household health, lowers fertility, lowers the crime rate, and 
improves labor mobility, all of which have external as well as individual bene-
fits (Schultz, 2002). Angrisr et a/. (2002) and Schultz (2004) both found that 
increased schooling from randomly assigned vouchers and conditional cash 
transfers led to reduced fertility behavior, although the evidence was somewhat 
weaker in the latter case. 
3 Consistent with that presumption, Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) and 
Godoy, Karlan, Rabindran, and Huanca (2005) find that returns on schoolmg 
are apparent in off-farm work but not on traditional farms. On the other hand, 
in agricultural environments with technological change it is the most educated 
that adapt first (Huffman and Orazem, 2007) and in India, returns on school-
ing were highest in areas where Green Revolution technologies were most com-
plementary to local agriculture (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996). 
4 Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson (2001) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2002) have examined the role of institutions that constrain or 
enhance mobility in retarding or fostering economic growth. 
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Figure 14.1. Distribution of self-reported literacy by grade attainment for 
youth aged 15-24, various countries 
Source: Author's compilation of summary data from 73 household surveys spanning 
57 developing countries provided by Claudio Montenegro of the World Bank. 
While years of schooling are consistently associated with higher 
earnings, time in school is only productive if it enhances cognitive 
skills. Investments of time and money in a child's schooling that fail to 
produce basic cognitive ski lls such as literacy are almost surely wasted. 
Studies that include both years of schooling and measures of cogni-
tive skills find that it is the latter and not the former that drive earn-
ings {Giewwe, 2002). Hanushek and Kimko {2000) found that it is 
average cognitive attainment and not average years of schooling that 
drives economic growth. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 14.1, the probability of attaining 
self-reported literacy rises with years of schooling, although there is 
considerable variation in the pattern across countries. Children who 
complete the primary cycle, about six years of schooling, are almost 
certain to attain literacy in most countries. While one could argue that 
these children could have attained literacy without schooling, the figure 
shows that relatively few literate individuals never attended school. 
This presumption that schooling is needed for literacy underlies the 
244 Peter F. Orazem 
Millennium Development Goal of attaining universal primary educa-
tion (UPE) by 2015. 
The World Bank estimates that meeting this goal will require an 
additional investment of $11-28 billion. Even this high cost may be 
understated because the children who are currently not in school are 
disproportionately located in areas that are expensive to reach with 
schooling services or in households that are less keen to send children 
to school. Making efficient progress toward the goal requires identify-
ing which illiterate populations can be served most economically. 
Many countries have placed an emphasis on raising enrollment rates 
for girls, and these efforts have succeeded in shrinking the gender 
enrollment gap over the past twenty years. Across 69 developing coun-
tries, the enrollment gap between boys and girls under age 12 exceeds 
10 percentage points in only 3 countries. Larger gaps are observed at 
the secondary schooling level. In contrast, the enrollment gap between 
urban and rural children under age 12 exceeds 10 percentage points in 
over half the countries. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) develop estimates 
of child grade attainment by household wealth status. In almost all 
countries, the gaps occur even at grade 1, and in all countries, the gaps 
are larger at higher-grade levels. Therefore, the most underserved pop-
ulations are the poor and children residing in rural areas. 
As shown in Table 14.1, some of the illiteracy problem is due to chil-
dren who never attend school and the rest from children who drop out 
before completing the primary cycle. It is the latter group that would 
be the most cost-effective population to target first in moving toward 
Table 14.1. Reasons for not attaining universal primary education 
Region 
West, Central Africa 
East, South Africa 
South Asia 
MENA 
South America 
Percent never 
enrolled 
35.6 
21.1 
23.3 
15.5 
4.8 
Percent not 
completing Grade 4 
37.5 
34.0 
24.7 
23.5 
17.0 
Source: Author's population-weighted averages of data from 49 country household 
surveys compiled in Lloyd (2005), Appendix Tables 3-5, 3-6, and A.1; pp. 160-163, 
658-661. All surveys were conducted in the late 1990s or early 2000s. 
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UPE and universal literacy. In Southern and Eastern Africa, the Middle 
East, and Latin America, much of the failure of children to complete 
even four years of schooling is due to children who drop out after start-
ing school. Getting children who have never attended school, as seems 
to be a disproportionate share of the illiteracy problems in South Asia 
and Central and Western Africa, to complete the primary cycle would 
be much more expensive. 
2. Supply-side interventions 
Supply-side policies aim to improve the quantity or quality of school-
ing offered. These policies include direct provision of newly constructed 
schools or of school supplies by the central government, improving the 
quality of existing schools, or improving the management of existing 
schools, but they can also involve the decentralization of school control 
to local authorities who are believed to be able to allocate resources 
more efficiently to meet school needs.5 
While high-quality, well-managed schools would enhance schooling 
outcomes, there are several reasons why investments in additional 
schools or improved school materials may fail the cost-effectiveness 
criteria. 
(1) If you build it, they may not come 
Building and staffing more schools requires that most expenses are 
incurred before we find out if parents wi 11 send their children to the school. 
In addition, some of the enrollment at the new schools will be from chil-
dren already in school who switch to the new school.6 Duflo's (2001) 
analysis of Indonesia's massive public works project that doubled the 
number of primary schools in a six-year period suggests that halving the 
average distance to school raised years of schooling by about 1.5%.7 
5 Glewwe and Kremer (2006) and Orazem and King (2007) provide much more 
derailed discussion of these and other interventions and related evaluation 
issues. 
6 See jimenez and Sawada (2001 ). 
' Because average distance was cut in half, Duflo's estimates suggest a 3% increase 
in years of schooling from the doubling of schools. Pitt eta/. (1993) estimate 
that the program raised enrollments by 2.5%, very similar to Duflo's estimates 
of the impact on years of schooling. 
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Filmer's (2004) analysis of the relationship between distance and enroll-
ments across 21 developing countries generally found very small marginal 
effects of lowering distance. This does not imply that school provision is 
unimportant- only that the existing supply is already located in the most 
dense child populations. New schools will be disproportionately located 
in relatively remote places where there are relatively few children and rel-
atively high costs. 
(2) Quality matters, but we don't know how to foster 
quality 
It is undoubtedly true that higher quality schools enhance human 
capital production and raise school demand. However, research has 
failed to identify how to foster improved quality. For example, 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) found that good teachers system-
atically produce better academic outcomes than do bad teachers. 
Unfortunately, good teachers and bad teachers look very much alike 
statistically- they have the same education levels, similar demograph-
ics, receive the same in-service training and are compensated similarly. 
In other words, teacher quality matters, but we don't know what 
matters for teacher quality. As teachers represent 74% of recurring 
school expenditures in developing countries (Bruns et al., 2003), it 
would seem that any policy aimed at improving school quality would 
have to confront teacher quality. The lack of agreement about how to 
foster teacher quality thwarts any general prescription regarding likely 
cost-effective avenues for improvement. 
(3) Are better managed schools better or are better schools 
better managed? 
The World Bank and other international agencies have made decen-
tralization of school management a central theme of new efforts to 
improve the efficiency of public service delivery in developing coun-
tries (Bardhan, 2005). The clear attraction of the strategy is that it 
offers the potential of improving school outcomes without spending 
more on the schools- we simply "spend smarter and not harder," to 
modify the common aphorism. The available evidence, even that 
often used by proponents of decentralization, is really too uncertain 
to engender a high degree of confidence that local management can 
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work in all settings. Studies by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) of the 
EDUC08 schools in El Salvador and by King and Ozier (2001) of 
the autonomous schools in Nicaragua found that schools that exer-
cised more local autonomy experienced gains in student attendance 
or test scores compared to other schools. However, participating 
schools are not randomly drawn- local authorities had to self-select 
into the programs and would be dropped if they did not fulfill their 
obligations. It is likely that the schools opting to accept local respon-
sibility differ in ways that could vary school outcomes compared to 
communities that did not elect to participate in the program. In other 
words, a finding that autonomous schools outperform schools that 
do not behave autonomously does not imply that the nonau-
tonomous schools would have better outcomes if they too behaved 
autonomously.9 
(4) Returns on increased school supply come at a long lag 
Supply-side interventions generally require the allocation of funds up 
front with the hoped-for child or parental response only becoming 
apparent later. Once built, there is no economic return to a new school 
unless children attend, but it may be five years before children attain 
permanent literacy. It may take some time for parents to react to school 
quality improvements. Similarly, it may take some time for teachers 
and students to respond to better local school management. The com-
bination of upfront costs, uncertain response, and delayed benefits 
place supply-side interventions at a cost-benefit disadvantage com-
pared to the demand-side alternatives we examine next. 
8 EDUCO comes from the Spanish acronym "Educacion con Parricipacion de Ia 
Comunidad" or "Community Managed Schools." 
9 Reinikka and Svensson (2004) found that a decentralization program in Uganda 
dramatically increased the proportion of funds that ended up reaching the 
schools from 20% in 1995 to 80% in 2001. Pressure to spend more on schools 
may have been due to publication of the amount of the transfers, making it more 
difficult to withhold money from the schools, bur it may have also come from 
better central monitoring of the accounts. Whether the resources were then allo-
cated better or whether the schools improved is nor clear, bur it does suggest that 
aspects of decentralization can be mandated. Gunnarsson eta/. (2007) show that 
most of the variation in the practice of local school autonomy occurs within and 
nor between countries, suggesting that national policies to foster decentralized 
dccisionmaking may be ineffective. 
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3. Demand-side interventions 
Demand-side policies have several distinct advantages over the supply-
side efforts to improve literacy. Demand-side stimulus can be targeted 
to the particular population currently not in school, whereas supply-
side interventions will typically result in some redistribution of chil-
dren already in school to the new schools. Demand-side interventions 
can also be made contingent on the child being in school, meaning that 
payment only occurs if the program is working. Finally, demand-side 
interventions can immediately influence behavior and so they have an 
advantage relative to the more heavily discounted benefits of supply-
side interventions. 
There are three types of interventions that I will review: interven-
tions in child health or nutrition that attempt to improve the child's 
physical or mental ability to learn; efforts to lower the cost of public 
or private schooling that enhance the household's ability to pay for 
schooling; and income transfers to the households made conditional on 
the child's enrollment that enhance the household's abi lity to afford 
schooling while lowering the opportunity cost of child time in school. 
These demand-side strategies work best where there is existing excess 
capacity of available schools so that more children can be added at low 
marginal cost. 
a: Health and schooling 
Numerous mechanisms to influence child health have been introduced 
through schools including the administration of nutrition supplements, 
school lunch plans, immunization programs, and health instructions. 
These programs have been installed from preschool through the 
schooling cycle, a lthough the most rigorously evaluated have been the 
ones targeted at younger children. 
There is substantial evidence that malnutrition early in life affects both 
cognitive and physical development that may be only partially reversible 
by better nutrition later in life. For example, Glewwe, Jacoby, and King 
(2001) found, in controlling for other household background measures, 
that children who were malnourished early in life start school later and 
complete fewer years of schooling. Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 
(2003) report similar findings for children who were malnourished 
because of exposure to civil war and drought in Zimbabwe. Eva luations 
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of efforts to provide nutritional supplements to at-risk preschool chil-
dren have shown permanent improvements in physical stature and cog-
nitive development, both of which can raise lifetime earnings. 
Behrman, Cheng, and Todd (2004) conducted an experimental eval-
uation of the Proyecto Integral de Desarrollo Infantil (PIDI) program 
in Bolivia. This program provides support for daycare, nutritional 
inputs, and preschool activities for low-income children aged 6-72 
months. For children exposed to the program for periods exceeding 
one year, the authors report permanent gains in cognitive development 
and fine motor skills that they translate to projected lifetime earnings 
growth with benefit-cost ratios ranging between 1.7 and 3.7. 
Grantham-McGregor eta/. (1991) report comparable findings for a 
similar program aimed at stunted infants in Jamaica, as do Armecin et 
al. (2005) for low-income rural households in the Philippines. 
Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) found that providing free breakfast to 
preschoolers raised attendance by 30% in Kenya but did not raise 
average measured skills. An analysis of a program that combined 
deworming medication with an iron supplement for preschoolers in 
India also raised attendance and physical stature. 
Nutritional programs can also have benefits at older ages. McGuire 
(1996) reported that giving iron supplements to secondary children 
(aged 13-15) in a low-income country can raise cognitive abilities by 
5%-25% or the equivalent of 0.05 years of schooling. Knowles and 
Behrman (2005) estimate that because the cost of the supplement is so 
small and administration inexpensive, it costs about $11 per added 
child-year of schooling and even these modest gains in schooling have 
substantial returns of 32 times the costs. 
In a widely publicized study, Miguel and Kremer (2004) examined 
the impact of a program which administered deworming medicine to 
schoolchildren in Kenya. The treated children increased their arten-
dance by 0.15 years per pupil, or an implied cost of $3.50 per child-
year of schooling. 
One reason these health interventions can be viewed as particularly 
cost-effective in raising schooling investments is that the schooling is a 
collateral benefit. The main aim for the programs is to improve child 
health which has a value in itself, raising the benefits side of the equa-
tion. On the cost side, expenses are only incurred if the children par-
ticipate and so there is much less potential for wasted investments than 
is the case for supply-side interventions. 
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Can these studies be generalized to other developing country set-
tings? Demographic and Health Survey data suggest that health 
reasons are less often cited as a reason for children not being in school 
than are child work inside or outside the home, poverty, or the child's 
lack of interest in school (Table 14.2). Health is cited more often in 
Africa and in urban areas of Latin America, but is less often cited else-
where. Nevertheless, in areas where malnutrition or worm infestations 
are more common, these interventions offer an inexpensive way to 
raise attendance, physical and mental capacity, and perhaps length of 
time in school, all of which would increase the probability that the chil-
dren attain permanent literacy. 
b: Lowering schooling costs 
In many countries, parents face significant school costs for their chil-
dren, ranging from uniforms and school supplies to tuition, fees and 
after-school tutorials. These expenses can represent a significant share 
of household income for poor families. Several countries have cut or 
eliminated the school fees charged by government schools, including 
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. In Tanzania, enrollments rose 
by 1.2 million children. A program that cut household costs of uni-
forms and school materials in Kenya increased years of schooling com-
pleted by 15% (Kremer, Moulin, and Namunyu, 2003). An evaluation 
by Deininger (2003) of the Uganda case found that elimination of 
primary fees lowered average costs by 60% and increased enrollments 
by 60%, with the largest gains in rural areas. Increased schooling 
demand led to considerable crowding as school supplies did not keep 
up. Pupil-teacher ratios rose from 38 to 65. 
In many developing countries, students are expected to get tutoring 
after school with the tutoring often provided by the same teacher they 
have in class. Poor children cannot afford these services and may fall 
behind their peers. A program in India hired local women with high 
school degrees to provide remedial tutoring to grade 3 and 4 children 
who had fallen behind in school (Banerjee eta/., 2003). At a cost of $5 
per child, the program raised the likelihood of a child performing at 
first-grade math level by 11.9 percentage points and at second-grade 
language levels by 9.9 percentage points. By the end of the two-year 
program, children were performing on average 0.28 standard devia-
tions higher on the test scores, roughly equivalent to having attained 
Table 14.2. Reasons for not attending school in urban and rural populations, by world region 
All world Sub-Saharan North Africa Central Asia South & Latin America 
regions Africa & Middle East & Europe East Asia & Caribbean 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Work outside the home 7.4 4.2 3.3 1.8 0.7 0.7 9.3 7.8 8.7 4.4 18.3 10.0 
Housework 7.3 11.5 5.3 7.9 5.6 9.9 6.3 9.3 10.7 19.7 11.7 17.9 
Inadequate school supply 1.9 4.9 1.8 3.2 2.0 6.2 1.3 3.0 1.7 2.7 2.6 10.8 
Poverty 18.2 18.1 24.1 23.9 4.6 3.4 1.3 0.8 24.2 26.3 11.9 11.3 
Lack of interest 47.3 44.0 45.2 42.7 76.6 69.4 65.0 58.2 49.3 41.7 34.0 33.5 
Health reasons 6.3 5.0 7.9 7.6 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.4 1.5 0.9 9.4 4.2 
Others 11.5 12.3 12.4 12.9 9.3 9.9 16.0 20.5 4.0 4.3 12.1 12.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
So1Jrce: Computations provided to the author by Elizabeth King based on dara from demographic and health surveys, various years. 
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one additional year of schooling. The reason the program is so inex-
pensive is that they hired less-qualified tutors at the market rate rather 
than mandating reaching certifications and paying the government rate 
for teachers. 
The availability of less-expensive teaching and infrastructure inputs 
is a major reason to consider private rather than government school 
options to serve expanding school demand. A program in Balochistan 
province in Pakistan attempted to spur both school demand for girls 
and to provide an incentive for private school entry by providing schol-
arships to girls. Randomly selected neighborhoods were given the 
option of packaging up to 100 girls' scholarships of 100 rupees per 
month (equivalent to $3) to try to induce a school operator to open a 
school in the area. In urban areas, even this modest subsidy was suffi-
cient to get schools to open (Kim, Alderman, and Orazem, 1999) and 
enrollments for both girls and boys rose relative to enrollments in 
control neighborhoods. The schools were opened at one quarter of the 
cost of a public school. A similar program in rural areas enabled schools 
to open, but the communities were too poor and the number of girls too 
few to allow the schools to become self-sustaining (Alderman, Kim, and 
Orazem, 2003). This raises an important lesson for the likely success of 
private school options to raise enrollments - invariably they will be 
most successful in areas that would have been able to support private 
schools in the absence of a subsidy, in other words, places with the 
greatest elasticity of supply for private schools. 
James (1993) reported that private schools are an even more impor-
tant component of school supply in developing than in developed 
countries. Often private schools will have excess capacity as measured 
by the relative numbers of students per teacher in comparison to gov-
ernment schools. If excess private school capacity exists, vouchers are 
an excellent mechanism by which governments can expand access less 
expensively than building additional government schools. One 
example of this strategy was the Colombia PACES program that pro-
vided subsidies to municipalities to provide secondary school vouchers 
to poor children. There was ample evidence that the existing govern-
ment school supply was insufficient to meet demand, and that private 
schools could add additional students without requiring additional 
teachers or classrooms (King, Orazem, and Wohlgemuth, 1999). 
Angrist eta/. (2002, 2006) demonstrated that children who were ran-
domly sorted into the program were 10% more likely to complete the 
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eighth grade and also scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on stan-
dardized tests, equivalent to adding an additional year of school. For 
those in doubt about external benefits from education, it is interesting 
that voucher recipients also were less likely to marry young or cohabit 
and were less likely to engage in child labor. A follow-up analysis con-
firmed that educational gains were permanent and not transitory. The 
voucher costs $228 per recipient including the opportunity cost of the 
children (Knowles and Behrman, 2005), which is swamped by the life-
time value of the induced additional years of schooling and cognitive 
attainment. 
Programs to reduce the costs of schooling to parents can have dra-
matic and quick impacts on children's achievement and years of 
schooling completed. They can take advantage of existing underuti-
lized private school and teaching capacity at a fraction of the cost of 
building and staffing new schools. Finally, they have the advantage of 
only using resources if the children use the services. 
c: Conditional cash transfers 
Latin American countries have moved rapidly to the use of conditional 
cash transfers to induce parents to send their children to school. These 
programs transfer income to a household in exchange for the house-
hold sending their children to school. Many of these programs include 
other components, typically adding nutritional supplements and man-
dating health clinic visits for children and health training for mothers, 
so the programs are not just aimed at education. Programs have 
been implemented and evaluated in Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua and 
Turkey and other programs have been or are being established in Chile, 
Ecuador, Peru and other countries. 
These programs will be most effective in environments in which 
schooling demand is highly income and child wage elastic and where 
large numbers of children are not in school. These circumstances nat-
urally fit poor households, neighborhoods and communities and these 
programs have in fact been aimed at the lowest income strata of 
society. While they have been tried in urban areas, most notably the 
bolsa esco/a programs in Brazil, there are significant advantages to 
using geographic targeting which is easier in less densely populated 
areas. In urban areas, it can be costly for authorities to try to establish 
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which households qualify on the basis of income and which don't, and 
such efforts lead to moral hazard problems in which households may 
take on activities that lower their earned income but increase their 
chance of getting the government transfer. 
Additionally, these programs will be most successful when they are 
aimed at populations not currently in school. In Brazil, where individ-
ual municipalities established their own programs until they were cen-
tralized more recently under the federal bolsa familias, some programs 
targeted children who were sufficiently young that the vast majority 
were already in school. As an example, in Mexico, conditional trans-
fers had almost no impact on primary enrollments because the children 
were already in school (Schultz, 2004b) while in Nicaragua, enroll-
ment rose by 23 percentage points (Maluccio, 2006). As a rule, the 
largest effects from conditional transfers have been in rural areas, con-
sistent with the presumption of higher income elasticities and oppor-
tunity cost elasticities in rural areas. 
IV. Benefit-cost summary 
My task in this exercise is to identify the low-lying fruit of educational 
expansion - what programs will raise returns most per dollar 
expended. These estimates must be taken with a considerable grain of 
salt- the returns will depend on the degree of economic freedom and 
growth in the economy and will depend on whether the program can 
be successfully targeted to those populations that will respond most 
elastically to the intervention. As a general rule, these populations wi ll 
be drawn disproportionately from the poor and rural areas at the 
primary level. At the secondary level, urban populations may be tar-
geted as well. In designing these programs, efforts to supplement exist-
ing supply by working outside the government school system are 
generally less expensive and subject to fewer regulatory constraints. 
Such private sector educational programs will be most effective in 
urban areas where the elasticity of educational supply is greatest. 
H ea lth programs offer opportunities for collateral educational benefits 
while improving child welfare. The enrollments of poor and rural chil-
dren, populations that have higher income and child wage elasticities, 
will also be particularly sensitive to conditional cash transfers. 
M y review of returns on literacy and years of schooling demon-
strated considerable consistency across countries, gender, and urban 
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and rural markets in the estimated returns on schooling. In the esti-
mates I report, I will assume that the return on schooling is an increase 
of 8% per year of schooling completed over an estimated average 
earning for labor in the country. Modest variation in the returns on 
schooling will not be sufficient to reverse the conclusions regarding 
whether the interventions are expected to pay for themselves. 
l assume a 45-year work career in my estimates. In my projection of 
lifetime earnings, l am implicitly assuming that the value of time 
outside the market rises in value at the same rate as the value of time 
in the labor market. This assumption is particularly suspect in the cases 
where women are not commonly found in the labor market, as in the 
Pakistan example. On the other hand, I do not make any adjustments 
for possible external benefits of women's education which would 
create a bias in the other direction, and I should further note that the 
literature has not demonstrated that returns on girls' schooling are sub-
stantia lly lower than are returns on boys' schooling. 
I provide summary information on benefit-cost ra tios for many of 
the programs mentioned above. Some of these are compiled personally 
while others take ratios developed by the authors of those studies. It is 
important to emphasize that some programs may have very high ratios 
and yet be only applicable to certain areas and not others. For example, 
the voucher program that appears to have been successful in urban 
areas of Colombia could not be implemented in rural areas without 
preexisting private schools. 
Finally, these estimates concentrate on the narrow returns on a year 
of schooling. This can be misleading in either direction. The reported 
benefit-cost ratios will be biased downward if increased years of 
schooling reduced fertility behavior of young women, as was found in 
Colombia and (less definitively) in Mexico. Incorporating the benefits 
of delayed fertility increases the benefit-cost ratios substantially, from 
3.3 to 25.6 in the case of the Colombia PACES program (Knowles and 
Behrman, 2005). On the other hand, it is possible that increased time 
in school will not have the same impact on lifetime earnings if the 
schools are of atypically poor quality. For example, the results of cog-
nitive tests of the Kenya experiments found that even though students 
spent more time in school, their performance on cognitive exams did 
not improve significantly. The increased enrollments in Uganda appar-
ently were only modestly accommodated by increased school materi-
als and so school quality suffered for all children. That raises concerns 
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that these programs did not permanently increase the children's life-
nme human capital stock. My view is that the tie berween years of 
schoolmg and lifetime earnings is sufficiently strong that the benefits 
will yet become apparent as these children age, even if they do not 
show immediately. It should be emphasized that in most of the cases 
summarized in Table 14.3, improved cognitive ability did accompany 
the mcreased time in school when both were measured. 
Table 14.3. Overview table of betzefit-cost ratios from various 
efforts to reduce illiteracy 
Low Discount High Discount 
(3%) (5%) 
Benefit Cost Benefit Cost 
($) ($) BCR ($) ($) BCR 
Health and nutrition 
programs 
Bohv1a PIDI: 5,107 1,394 3.66 3,230 301 2.48 
preschool and 
nutnuon• 
Kenya: dcwormingh 2,246! 3.5! 642 1,652! 3.5! 472 
Kenya: preschool 2,246! 29.13 77 1,652! 28.6! 58 
and nutntion' 
Iron supplements 474! 10.49! 45.2 330 10.29! 32.1 
to <,econdary 
students4 
Scholar~hip/voucher 
programs 
4,287 971 4.41 3,152 953 3.31 Colomb1a: PACES 
secondary school 
urban voucherd 2,887! 223! 12.9 Pak1stan urban girls' 3,924! 225! 17.4 
scholarship• 
Pak1stan rural gi rls' 3,138! 311! 10.1 2,302! 
326! 7.1 
scholarship• 
lnd1a balsakl11s 7,002 9.85! 711 
5,152 9.76! 528 
tutorial program' 
Uganda free primary 3,675! 140! 26.3 2,703! 
140! 19.3 
school programR 
Lack of Education 
Table 14.3. (cont.) 
Conditional cash transfers 
Mexico Progresah 
Nicaragua: RED' 
Notes: 
Low Discount 
(3%) 
Benefit 
($) 
Cost 
($) 
17,565! 2,585! 
5,920 1 ,574! 
Behrman, Cheng and Todd (2004)# 
Miguel and Kremer (2004)• 
Vermeersch and Kremer (2005)• 
Knowles and Behrman (2005)# 
Alderman, Kim and Orazem (2003) 
Banerjee, Cole, Duflo and Linden (2003) 
Deininger (2003)t 
Schultz (2004a) 
Maluccio (2006) 
# Benefit-<:ost ratio computed in the cited paper. 
High Discount 
(5%) 
Benefit 
BCR ($) 
Cost 
($) 
6.8 12,923! 2,535! 
3.80 4,356 1,574! 
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BCR 
5.1 
2.80 
• Cost per year of schooling reported in MIT Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action 
Lab. (2005). 
Per year of schooling induced. 
Assumes that the government expands school space to accommodate additional 
students at the average cost per primary student. 
Estimated benefit-cost ratios for discount rates 3% and 5% are 
reported in Table 14.3. I use the 5% discount rate because it was the 
rate most commonly used in the cited literature. I report the estimates 
of other authors when I assess that they are more carefully done than 
anything I could do from reading the paper. 
It is immediately clear that these benefit-cost ratios are large and 
some extremely large. The largest returns are from: 
(a) very low cost demand-side interventions; 
(b) interventions in areas with an atypical need for the intervention 
such as the schools in Kenya in which 92% of children had worm 
infestations; 
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(c) programs with easily identified beneficiaries that would not be able 
to access the service otherwise, such as the poor children who 
lacked tutors in India. 
The highly selected nature of the sites for the intervention and the chil-
dren targeted for the programs suggest that these benefit-cost ratios are 
upper-bound estimates. Were the programs to be expanded, they would 
be placed in less productive sites and with less needy children. Note that 
the more broadly distributed interventions such as the conditional cash 
transfer programs are less selective in terms of the places where the 
intervention is tried and the uniformity of need among the beneficiaries, 
and so their benefit-cost ratios are more modest as a result. 
The largest benefit-cost ratios are interventions early in the child's 
life. These interventions are less costly and the opportunity costs of the 
beneficiaries are very low. In addition, these interventions have the 
longest potential period of returns. Nevertheless, programs aimed at 
older children can be successful, such as the Colombia PACES program 
or the iron supplement aimed at secondary students. Both did not 
involve building more schools or adding capacity, a key to keeping cost 
low relative to benefits. 
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